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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a nonpartisan public policy
research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free
markets, and limited government. Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies was
established in 1989 to promote the principles of limited constitutional government
that are the foundation of liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and
studies, conducts conferences, and publishes the annual Cato Supreme Court
Review. It also files amicus briefs with the courts, including in cases focusing on
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause such as United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). The present case centrally
concerns Cato because it represents the federal government’s most egregious
attempt to exceed its constitutional powers.
Randy E. Barnett is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory at
the Georgetown University Law Center. Prof. Barnett has taught constitutional
law, contracts, and criminal law, among other subjects, and has published more
than 90 articles and reviews, as well as eight books. His book, Restoring the Lost
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, 2004), and other scholarship
concerns the original meaning of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses
1

Pursuant to Rule Fed. R. App. P. 29, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants,
through their respective counsel, have consented to the filing of this brief.
1

and their relationship to the powers enumerated in the Constitution.

His

constitutional law casebook, Constitutional Law: Cases in Context (Aspen 2008),
is widely used in law schools throughout the country. In 2004 he argued Gonzales
v. Raich in the Supreme Court.

In 2008, he was awarded a Guggenheim

Fellowship in Constitutional Studies.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The individual mandate goes beyond Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce under existing doctrine. The outermost bounds of the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects doctrine”—prevent
Congress from reaching intrastate non-economic activity regardless of whether it
substantially affects interstate commerce. Nor under existing law can Congress
reach inactivity even if it purports to act pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme.
That is, as the court below recognized, “in every Commerce Clause case
presented thus far, there has been some sort of activity. In this regard, the Health
Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of first impression.” Thomas More
Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

What

Congress is attempting to do here is quite literally unprecedented.
“The government has never required people to buy any good or service as a
condition of lawful residence in the United States.” Cong. Budget Office, The

2

Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994).
Nor has it ever said that every man and woman faces a civil penalty for declining
to participate in the marketplace. And never before have courts had to consider
such a breathtaking assertion of raw power under the Commerce Clause. Even in
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely”
the power to regulate what farmers grew, not to mandate that people become
farmers, much less to force people to purchase farm products.

Even if not

purchasing health insurance is considered an “economic activity”—which of
course would mean that every aspect of human life is economic activity—there is
no legal basis for Congress to require individuals to enter the marketplace to buy a
particular good or service.
Amici fully endorse the arguments offered in the appellants’ brief. We offer
this brief to highlight the limits on federal power under the Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause and to underscore the necessity of preserving those
limits in the light of constitutional text, structure, and history.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

The Mandate is Unconstitutional Under the “Substantial Effects”
Doctrine That Defines the Scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause
in the Context of the Commerce Power
Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular

“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering
whether it falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Gonzalez v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610
(2000) (in turn quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)). The
significant New Deal cases, however, found the authority for the “substantial
effects doctrine” not in the inherent power of the Commerce Clause, but in its
execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Although prevailing legal

convention describes the New Deal cases as expanding the definition of
“commerce,” a closer examination of these decisions shows that the definition of
“commerce” remained unchanged.

The Court instead asked whether federal

regulation of the activity in question is a necessary and proper means for exercising
the power to regulate interstate commerce because the activity substantially affects
that commerce. Beyond that point Congress has never been able go.
In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court
considered the power of Congress to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and
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hours.” Id. at 105. Rather than stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court
focused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,
the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”
Id. The authority cited for this proposition did not come from Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)—the Commerce Clause case which the Court had
already cited throughout its opinion—but instead from the foundational Necessary
and Proper Clause case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
The Court in Darby makes it apparent that the substantial effects doctrine
has always rested on the Necessary and Proper Clause. The “appropriate means to
the attainment of a legitimate end” language explicitly references Chief Justice
Marshall’s seminal explanation of the Necessary and Proper Clause: “Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” Id. at
421 (emphasis added). Moreover, the phrase in Darby, “the exercise of the granted
power,” 312 U.S. at 105, evokes the language of the Clause itself: “carries into
execution the foregoing powers.” U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 18.

5

A year after Darby, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court
continued this reasoning—that “commerce” was not being redefined but rather the
challenged measures were a necessary and proper means for regulating commerce
as historically understood. Like Darby, Wickard is explicit in its reliance on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch, id. at 130, n.29, as authority for
congressional power—even if Roscoe Filburn’s personal production of wheat
“may not be regarded as commerce.”

Id. at 125.

Thus, contrary to the

conventional academic view, Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause to
include the power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated,
substantially affects interstate commerce. “Instead, Wickard actually stands for the
proposition that this intrastate activity can be regulated because the failure to do so
would impede the government’s ability to regulate the interstate price of wheat by
restricting supply.”

Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the

Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, N.Y.U. J.L.L.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680392.
Fast forward 50 years, when the Court clarified the substantial effects
doctrine by confining congressional power under the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clause to the regulation of intrastate economic activity. Again, as in
Wickard and Darby, the Court did not redefine “commerce” but only refined its
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analysis of whether the means adopted by Congress were necessary and proper to
the end of regulating commerce.
In United States v. Lopez, the Court found that “[e]ven Wickard, which is
perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in
a school zone does not.” 514 U.S. at 560. Five years later, in United States v.
Morrison, the Court held that the gender-motivated violence regulated by the
Violence Against Women Act was not itself economic activity and thus had only
an “indirect and remote” or “attenuated” effect on interstate commerce. 529 U.S.
at 608 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (in turn quoting NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937))), 615.
Chief Justice Rehnquist described the limits of Congress’s power as follows:
“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis
added). Conversely, non-economic activity cannot be regulated merely because it
has “substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption,” or
indirectly affects interstate commerce through a “but-for causal chain.” Morrison,
529 U.S. at 615. That is because the subject of regulation must have a “close”
qualitative “relation to interstate commerce,” not merely a substantial
“quantitative” impact on the national economy. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37.

7

The distinction between economic and non-economic activity allowed the
Court to determine when it was truly necessary to regulate intrastate commerce
without engaging in protracted, and arguably impossible, attempts to evaluate the
“more or less necessity or utility” of a measure. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on
the Constitutionality of a National Bank (February 23, 1791), in Legislative and
Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 98 (H. St. Clair & D.A. Hall
eds., reprinted Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1832). This Necessary and Proper
doctrine limits congressional power to regulating intrastate economic activity
because this category of activity is closely connected to interstate commerce,
without recognizing an implied federal power that would amount to a federal
police power that the Supreme Court has always denied existed. See, e.g., Lopez,
514 U.S. at 567. Moreover, a power to regulate intrastate economic activity that
has a substantial affect on interstate commerce is not so broad as to obstruct or
supplant the states’ police powers.
In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and
enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administrable line beyond which
Congress could not go in enacting “necessary and proper” means to execute its
power to regulate interstate commerce.

The “substantial effects” doctrine, as

limited in Lopez and Morrison, thus established the outer doctrinal bounds of
“necessity” under the Necessary and Proper Clause.

8

Authority for this view can be found in Chief Justice Marshall’s subsequent
defense of his McCulloch opinion. Writing as “A Friend of the Constitution,”
Marshall explained that the constitutionality of congressional acts depend “on their
being the natural direct and appropriate means, or the known and usual means, for
the execution of a given power.”

John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v.

Maryland 186 (Gerald Gunter ed., Stanford University Press 1969) (from essay of
July 5, 1819). Lopez and Morrison employ that same logic: Only the regulation of
intrastate economic activity qualifies as “natural direct and appropriate means, or
the known and usual means” of executing the commerce power.
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court found the cultivation of
marijuana to be an economic activity that Congress could prohibit as a necessary
and proper exercise of its commerce power. 545 U.S. at 22. Raich explicitly
adhered to the economic/non-economic distinction set out in Lopez and Morrison.
As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, “Our case law firmly establishes
Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 17
(emphasis added). The majority in Raich, therefore, reaffirmed that the scope of
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute its commerce
power is limited to reaching economic activity.

9

Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or
Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of a commodity traded interstate that brought their
personal cultivation under congressional power. See Barnett, supra, at 18-19.
Instead, Justice Stevens invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of
“economics”—“the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and thus refused to adopt the government’s sweeping
theory here that non-participation in the marketplace was itself economic activity.
As Professor Randy Beck has explained, “Given the close relationship
between intrastate and interstate economic activity, a statute regulating local
economic conduct will usually be calculated to accomplish an end legitimately
encompassed within the plenary congressional authority over interstate
commerce.” J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 581, 625. In short, regulating intrastate economic
activity can be a “necessary” means of regulating interstate commerce as that term
is understood under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The obvious corollary is
that regulating non-economic activity cannot be “necessary,” regardless of its
effect on interstate commerce. And a power to regulate inactivity is even more
remote from Congress’s power over interstate commerce.
In Raich, the Court identified the doctrinal distinction between economic
and non-economic activity by looking back at all the substantial effects cases it had
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previously decided and found that “the pattern is clear.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
Similarly, the leading Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause
precedents establish a doctrinal line between activity and inactivity, even if that
line has heretofore escaped articulation because no precedent has presented the
distinction as sharply as this case. Just as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in Lopez
regarding the economic/non-economic line, therefore, we can examine existing
case law and find that the individual mandate is unsustainable under existing
interpretations of congressional power.
In Wickard, Roscoe Filburn had grown wheat and thus with his own actions
inserted himself into the realm of economic activity. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15.
In NLRB, the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was subject to regulatory
schemes because it engaged in the business of steelmaking. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 26.
The Civil Rights Cases concerned parties that operated a restaurant and a hotel,
respectively. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964). And finally, in Raich,
Diane Monson and Angel Raich grew, processed, and consumed medicinal
marijuana. Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
All these cases fall into two general categories. Raich, 545 U.S. at 35-38
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the
regulation of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation
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of interstate commerce”—and limits thereto).

First, if someone affirmatively

places himself into the economic realm by starting a business or participating in
agriculture, manufacturing, or another commercial endeavor, Congress can
regulate those activities as a necessary and proper exercise of its power to regulate
interstate commerce. This regulation may mandate certain activities—for example,
recordkeeping, posting workplace regulations, and providing fire extinguishers—
but it never requires someone to start the business or buy a product in the first
place. The second category, articulated in Raich, concerns Congress’s regulatory
attempts to narrow a particular type of commerce, such as that involving drugs.
This regulation can require individuals to stop engaging in certain activities as a
necessary and proper means of regulating (or, in this case, limiting) interstate
commerce.

In other words, Congress can regulate or perhaps even prohibit

economic acts that substantially affect interstate commerce, but it cannot force
people to undertake such acts—not even ones that, if voluntarily undertaken,
would have been subject to regulation.
With the individual mandate, Congress addressed the requirement that it
confine itself to regulating economic activity by redefining the word “activity” to
include “decisions” or even “non-actions.” Yet the vital limiting principles on
federal power cannot be brushed away by recourse to the admitted importance of
reforming health care or the cost-shifting aspects of that market. There is no
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“health care is different” constitutional exemption—and indeed Congress could
have reformed the health care system in any number of ways that may have been
better or worse as a matter of policy but would have been legally unassailable. The
reason for this lawsuit and dozens of others around the country, however, is that
the health insurance mandate is supported by no Supreme Court precedent. As one
district court recently said while striking down the individual mandate, “Every
application of Commerce Clause power found to be constitutionally sound by the
Supreme Court involved some sort of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion
by an individual or legal entity.” Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *37-38 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010).
If allowed to stand, the individual mandate would collapse the traditional
distinction between acts and omissions by characterizing a failure to act as a
“decision” not to act—thereby transforming inactivity into activity by linguistic
alchemy. It would also then collapse the distinction between economic and noneconomic activity by characterizing an activity as “economic” not based on the
type of activity it is but on whether it has any economic effect. Since any activity,
in the aggregate, can be said to have an economic effect, the line the Court drew
between activity that Congress can reach and that which is outside its powers
would be destroyed. The government’s novel theory would end our scheme of
limited and enumerated powers, as well as erase the long-held constitutional
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distinction “between what is truly national and what is truly local.” Lopez, 514
U.S. at 567-68 (citing NLRB, 301 U.S. at 30). All of this transgresses the current
state of Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine.

II.

The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of
a Broader Regulatory Scheme” because Congress Cannot Regulate
Inactivity
Unable to directly justify the individual mandate under existing Commerce

Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine (let alone the fallback taxing
power theories that we do not confront here), the government has resorted to a new
theory: that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate
economic activity when doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory
scheme.

That is, while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, nor a

regulation of intrastate economic activity, nor even a regulation of intrastate
noneconomic activity, an economic mandate is a necessary and proper means of
exercising the lawful ends of regulating the interstate health insurance industry.
The government’s proposed theory that Congress may mandate economic
activity rests on a sentence of dictum from Lopez and a concurring opinion by
Justice Scalia in Raich that identify circumstances when Congress may reach
wholly intrastate noneconomic activity.

Even if such a doctrine is someday

accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court, these two sources speak only of the
regulation of activity not inactivity. Indeed, in his opinion in Raich, Justice Scalia
14

uses the word “activity” or “activities” 42 times.

See Jason Mazzone, Can

Congress Force You to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39.
In Lopez, the Court referred to reaching intrastate noneconomic activity
when doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.” 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed
that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37
(emphasis added). Neither formulation extends to the regulation of inactivity and
there is good reason to doubt that he would ever extend his proposed doctrine so
far. For Scalia is the Justice who referred to the Necessary and Proper Clause as
“the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.” Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (Scalia, J.).
If and when a majority of the Court does accept Justice Scalia’s “essential to
a broader regulatory scheme” rationale for reaching intrastate noneconomic
activity, some doctrine limiting “necessity” under this theory will be required. The
distinction between economic and noneconomic activity would obviously provide
no limit to this doctrine. The whole purpose for his concurring opinion was to
question the usefulness of that distinction in dealing with the problems posed by
Raich. Without some judicially administrable limiting doctrine, however, the fear
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expressed in Lopez and Morrison that Congress would then possess a general
police power would be realized.
The distinction between activity and inactivity provides the same type of
judicially administrable limiting doctrine for what is “necessary” to execute the
commerce power under an “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” theory as the
economic/non-economic distinction provides for the substantial effects doctrine.
Now that Congress has, for the first time, sought to reach inactivity, all the
Supreme Court need do is look back at its previous substantial effects doctrine
cases, as it did in Lopez, to see that every case decided until now involved the
regulation of activity, not inactivity.
Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under both the
“substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines
would serve the same purpose as the economic/non-economic distinction. Such a
formal limitation would help assure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to execute the commerce power would be truly incidental to that power and
not remote. Doing nothing at all involves not entering into a literally infinite set of
economic transactions. Giving a discretionary power over this set to Congress
when it deems it essential to a regulation of interstate commerce would give
Congress a plenary and unlimited police power over inaction that is typically far
remote from interstate commerce. However imperfect, some such line must be
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drawn to preserve Article I’s scheme of limited and enumerated powers. Because
accepting the government’s theory in this case would effectively demolish that
scheme, the government’s theory is unconstitutional.
And the government implicitly acknowledged that problem in its previous
briefs, in attempting to distinguish the health insurance business as “unique” in a
variety of respects and thereby appear to be providing a limiting principle. Defs.’
Response to Pls’. Mot. Prelim. Inj. and Br. Supp. at 24 n.10, Thomas More Law
Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-11156); Defs.’
Surreply to Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. and Br. Supp. at 11-12, Thomas More Law
Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-11156). But
examining the substance of the law in question is precisely the sort of inquiry into
the “more or less necessity” of a measure that has been rejected by the Supreme
Court since McCulloch.

Once the power to mandate economic activity is

recognized here, the Court will refuse to examine future mandates on a case-bycase basis to see if they are factually similar to the health insurance mandate.
Therefore, if this mandate is allowed to stand, Congress will henceforth have the
discretionary power to impose mandates at its discretion regardless of the
“uniqueness” of the market in question. The government’s attempt to limit the
doctrine by its factual assertions is chimerical.
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III.

The Individual Mandate Constitutes a “Commandeering of the
People” That Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper
Clause

The

Supreme

Court,

in

two

novel

cases

presenting

theretofore

unprecedented assertions of power under the Commerce Clause, has stated that
Congress cannot use this power to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and
executive officers. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). As Justice Scalia explained, doing so would
be “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty,” and therefore improper under our federalist system. Printz, 521 U.S.
at 935. In Printz, Justice Scalia pointed to the Tenth Amendment as the source of
“residual state sovereignty” in a constitutional system that confers upon Congress
“not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.” Id. at 919
(citing U.S. Const. amend. X). He then elaborated that the mandate at issue, even
if necessary, could not be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause: “When
a ‘la[w]…for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle
of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional
provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into execution the Commerce
Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added).
Just as mandating that states take action is improper commandeering, so too
is mandating that individual citizens enter into transactions with private companies
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an improper commandeering of the people. See generally, Barnett, supra, at 2742. The Tenth Amendment reads: “The powers not delegated by the Constitution
to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added). In this
way, the text of the Tenth Amendment protects not just state sovereignty, but also
popular sovereignty.
Chief Justice John Jay affirmed the priority of popular sovereignty in the
first great constitutional case before the Supreme Court, Chisholm v. Georgia,
noting that the “sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation, and the
residuary sovereignty of each State in the people of each state,” as the people were
“truly the sovereigns of the country.” 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793). Fellow
Founder James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the
individual citizen: “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why
may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this
likewise?” Id. at 456 (emphasis added). Although the Eleventh Amendment
reversed the outcome of Chisholm and the Supreme Court has interpreted that
Amendment as establishing state sovereignty, the Court has never repudiated the
priority of popular sovereignty. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)
(“in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
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government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts.”).
Just as the Constitution disallows the “commandeering” of states as a means
of regulating interstate commerce, thus so too does it bar a commandeering of the
people for this purpose. Various express provisions of the Constitution reflect this
anti-commandeering principle. For example, persons may not be mandated to
quarter soldiers in their homes in time of peace, U.S. Const. amend. III, to testify
against themselves, id., amend. V, or to labor for another, id., amend. XIII.
What very few mandates are imposed on the people by the federal
government all rest on the fundamental pre-existing duties that citizens owe that
government. Such are the duties to register for the draft and serve in the armed
forces if called, to sit on a federal jury, and to file a tax return. See, e.g., Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and noble
duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to reject a
claim founded on the Thirteenth Amendment). In the United States, there is not
even a duty to vote. So there is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme and
noble duty” to engage in economic activity when doing so is convenient to the
regulation of interstate commerce.
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There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual mandate is
not “proper.” In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor explained that
mandates on states are improper because, “where the Federal Government directs
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.” 505 U.S. 144,
169 (1992). That proposition applies to the commandeering of individuals as well:
the individual mandate has allowed Congress and the president to escape political
accountability for increasing taxes on persons making less than $250,000 per year
by compelling them to make payments directly to private companies. It is the
evasion of that accountability that explains why the mandate was formulated as a
regulatory “requirement” enforced by a monetary “penalty.”
The individual mandate crosses a fundamental line between limited
constitutional government and limitless power cabined only by the vagaries of
political will—which is to say, not cabined at all. If the word “proper” is to be
more than dead letter, it at least means that acts which destroy the very purpose of
Article I—to enumerate and therefore limit the powers of Congress—are improper.
If the federal power to enact “economic mandates” were upheld here, Congress
would be free to require anything of the citizenry so long as it was in the name of a
comprehensive regulatory plan. Unsupported by any fundamental, preexisting, or
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traditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic mandates” on the people is
improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of that word.

Allowing

Congress to exercise such power would turn “citizens” into “subjects.”

IV.

The Inactivity/Activity Distinction, Like the Economic/NonEconomic Distinction, Provides a Judicially Administrable Line By
Which Some Laws Are Deemed Too Remote From the Commerce
Power—and Thus Resists Making Congress’s Enumerated Powers
into a Plenary Police Power

The analysis offered above demonstrates both the extensions and limits that
the Necessary and Proper Clause creates when applied to the Commerce Clause.
The limits to the Necessary and Proper Clause, most recently expressed in Lopez
and Morrison, are part of a long tradition in which judicially administrable limits
are given to the Clause in order to maintain limited and enumerated powers of
Congress within a federal system.
A. The Supreme Court Has Always Resisted Any Ruling that Would
Give Congress Plenary Power
Although the history of Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause
jurisprudence does not provide a consistent interpretation of the clauses, there is
one rule that has remained constant throughout: “we always have rejected readings
of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit
Congress to exercise a police power; our cases are quire clear that there are real
limits to federal power.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). These
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limits to federal power do not solely derive from the political process. From
McCulloch onward, the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses have never
been held non-justiciable and left completely to congressional discretion. The
inquiry begins with the determination that an activity “fits somewhere along a
causal chain of federal powers,” but does not end there. United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1966 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 566). “The inferences must be controlled by some limitations lest, as Thomas
Jefferson warned, congressional powers become completely unbounded by linking
one power to another ad infinitum in a veritable game of ‘‘this is the house that
Jack built.’’” Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston
(Apr. 30, 1800), 31 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 547 (B. Oberg ed. 2004)). 2
It is worth asking, therefore, whether some test can be devised to distinguish
a constitutionally permissible form of mandated activity from a constitutionally
impermissible form. In other words, would the health insurance mandate, if
allowed to stand, permit any future limitation on congressional power?
The government argues, essentially, that not purchasing health care is a
particularly pernicious type of inactivity upon which the entire fee-shifting edifice
2

Kennedy also here advocated enhanced scrutiny, beyond a mere rational-basis
test, of the connection between means and ends when considering claims of power
under the Commerce Clause. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). This clarification strongly signals that his joining the majority in
Raich did not represent an abandonment of his prior stance in Lopez. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of providing health care is built. Thus, in the aggregate, the effects of allowing
individuals to opt out of the system are particularly dire.
Such logic may be sound given the complex legislation that Congress chose
to pass, but if so then it is undoubtedly true of many if not all markets. There are
an infinite number of things that everyone is not doing right now, many of which
might have an effect on health.

Making everyone do those things—from

purchasing orthopedic shoes to joining a gym—would undoubtedly have
substantial effects on interstate commerce. Indeed, diet and exercise have a greater
effect on health care outcomes than ownership of a health insurance policy. See,
e.g., Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding
Medicaid's Failure, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 705, 718 (citing Victor R. Fuchs, Who
Shall Live? Health, Economics, and Social Choice at 54-55 (1998)), 725 (2005).
If upheld, therefore, the individual mandate would usher in a new era of
constitutional jurisprudence in which either (a) courts review every congressional
action to determine whether a particular law is more or less necessary and proper,
an inquiry which it has traditionally rejected because it would encroach upon
Congress’s authority to make policy decisions for the areas over which its power
duly extends; or, (b) there are no longer any checks on congressional power
outside the political process and claims under the Necessary and Proper Clause
become non-justiciable “political questions.”
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Either choice would fly in the face of constitutional precedent, history, and
philosophy—the letter and spirit of our founding document. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 421. In order to maintain meaningful and justiciable limits on federal
power, the Supreme Court has always articulated limiting principles.

With the

individual mandate, Congress has not only bootstrapped its own power—by
creating a scheme that requires an unprecedented economic mandate—it has used
that same strap to pull every American from passive inactivity into some form of
action. As the Court has expressed time and again, the Constitution “does not
tolerate reasoning that would ‘convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
B. A Judicially Administrable Limiting Principle on Congressional
Power Has Always Been An Essential Part of Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause Jurisprudence
The demand for an articulable limit to federal power is not a mere linguistic
contrivance or a plaintive recourse to the nullification and “states rights” theories
obviated by the Civil War. Rather, such limiting principles are essential to the
very concept of federalism. In an integrated national system in which goods, ideas,
and people flow freely across state borders, anything can be realistically construed
to have an effect on interstate commerce. And, in the aggregate, those effects
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could certainly be substantial. Arguments based on these effects, such as the
government’s here, have salience precisely because such effects do exist.
Given the obviousness of such effects to both the Framers and modern
interpreters, and given the concept of an enumerated and limited federal
government, the mere substantial effects of an intrastate economic activity cannot
be, and is not, the only test for constitutionality. The need to be able to articulate a
limiting principle is as much an aspect of Necessary and Proper Clause
jurisprudence as those principles that have enlarged the scope of congressional
power. If we only ask how a particular provision augments congressional power
and not how it limits that same power, then we are examining only half of one of
the foundational tenets in constitutional jurisprudence. Cf. The Federalist No. 51,
at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.”).
Nobody disputes that the market for health care is an important one and that
people’s decisions on whether to buy health insurance (and if so in what form)
affects the economy. Instead the issue is how the document that is the font of all of
Congress’s legitimate authority limits federal power. The Constitution does so,
among other structural mechanisms, by granting Congress a finite set of
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enumerated powers.

As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in the foundational

Commerce Clause case of Gibbons v. Ogden, “The enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated.” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
During oral arguments in Gibbons, Daniel Webster conceded that “the words
used in the constitution, ‘to regulate commerce,’ are so very general and extensive,
that they might be construed to cover a vast field of legislation,” and thus the
words “must have a reasonable construction, and the power should be considered
as exclusively vested in Congress so far, and so far only, as the nature of the power
requires.” Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 14.
In the context of the Commerce Clause, the Framers adopted the limiting
principle that Congress’ regulatory authority reached only physical items that
crossed state lines and did not reach local agriculture and manufacture. See Lopez,
514 U.S. at 585-87 (Thomas, J., concurring); Randy Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101 (2001); Randy Barnett,
New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 Ark. L. Rev.
847 (2003). They did so “despite being well aware that agriculture, manufacturing,
and other matters substantially affected commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 591
(Thomas, J., concurring).
In the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause executing that same
commerce power, McCulloch v. Maryland provided a limiting principle distinct
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from the “more or less utility” standard disfavored by the Framers for unduly
interfering with congressional discretion over policy matters.

During oral

arguments in McCulloch, the attorney for Maryland offered a fascinating argument
that thematically mirrors the one now offered by the government. Needing to
overcome the clear problem that the challenged bank of the United States was the
second such bank—with the first having been presumptively constitutional—
Joseph Hopkinson argued that a national bank, once a necessity, was no longer
needed: “a power growing out of a necessity which may not be permanent, may
also not be permanent. It has relation to circumstances which change; in a state of
things which may exist at one period, and not at another . . . [W]hatever might
have been the truth and force of the bank argument in 1791, they were wholly
wanting in 1816.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 333. In contrast, Chief Justice
Marshall in both McCulloch and his defense of that case as “A Friend to the
Constitution” proposed a means/end test that did not require judges to evaluate a
given law’s relative necessity or utility.
By claiming that “health care is special” and that the unique features of the
health care market justify the individual mandate, however, the government asks
courts to weigh the “more or less necessity or utility” of the new health care law.
In doing so, it ignores the unprecedented nature of the individual mandate and,
instead, offers a long-discarded method of constitutional interpretation.
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Striking down the individual mandate requires no such tortuous calculations,
and it would affect no other law ever enacted by Congress. The Court in
McCulloch rightly rejected Maryland’s arguments and chose, instead, to fashion a
test that respected congressional prerogative while drawing a judicially
administrable line beyond which congressional power did not reach. Then, as now,
“the task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more
than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than
everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis).” Raich, 545
U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

CONCLUSION
For the first time in American history, the federal government has attempted
to “commandeer the people” by imposing on them an “economic mandate.” Such
economic mandates cannot be justified by existing Supreme Court doctrines
defining and limiting the powers of Congress. Upholding the power to impose
economic mandates “would fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal
government to the states and the people; nobody would ever again be able to claim
plausibly that the Constitution limits federal power.” Ilya Shapiro, State Suits
Against Health Reform Are Well Grounded In Law—And Pose Serious Challenges,
29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232 (June 2010). It would turn citizens into subjects.
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As the first court considering a constitutional challenge to the individual
mandate recognized last summer, “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause and
the associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.” Virginia v.
Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010). Only the Supreme Court is
empowered to reconsider the outer bounds of federal power under the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and the district court erred in going beyond
existing doctrinal limits in this area. Accordingly, amici respectfully request this
Court to reverse the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.
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